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1 Introduction
This paper uses a monetary dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model by Falk Mazelis (2015) with shadow banking system integrated in the
financial sector slightly adjusting the model, to discuss the financial sector
of China with a historical approach providing justification towards the ad-
justment. The examined model is altered towards Chinese characteristics to
theoretically study and analyse macroeconomic shock effects of the adjust-
ments through the six-agent economy while reflecting the concept of shadow
bank modelling in China.
The main motives behind the approach are recent worries of excess credit
in the shadow banking sector as well as theoretical studies of banks’ and
shadow banks’ different reactions to monetary shocks. The latter is a finding
that emerged after the sub-prime crisis in 2008. Additionally, the unique
characteristics China’s economy amplify the interest within the motives.
State-ownership with gradual actions towards a marked-driven economy and
historically tremendous economic growth are only a few examples of what
make China’s banking sector different and very interesting. China’s financial
sector has frictions that allows non-efficient allocation of capital, such as In-
terest rate ceilings and implicit guarantees. Both will be a a topic of detailed
discussion in this paper. (Anzoategui et al., 2015).
There is no all-encompassing definition for a shadow bank, which is one of
the reasons scientific economic discussion has started to use terms such as
shadow banking sector and shadow banking system. Shadow banking sys-
tem bundles financial institutions and organizations that offer similar services
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and assume similar risks than banks, but are not institutionally recognized
as banks. The concept has broadly emerged as popular issue of debate dur-
ing and after the sub-prime crisis of 2008. A correlation between the crisis
and shadow banking sector has been established and has motivated new ap-
proaches to study shadow banking, such as Verona et al., 2011. However,
one must be careful when defining the shadow banking sector.
Shadow banking sector’s form and array is dependent on legislation. When
forming an overall opinion on the shadow banking system, one must strongly
emphasize the elements of versatility and complexity. The entire system is a
collection of different financial institutions with similar business approaches
and reactions to economic phenomena. Financial Stability Board (2012) de-
fines shadow banking as ”the system of credit intermediation that involves
entities and activities outside the regular banking system” (Li, 2014). Even
the definition of shadow banking differs by country, but the previous quote
could act as the global basis upon which more precise definitions are being
constructed.
No official statistics of shadow banking systems’ size exist, which means all
data related to it is based on estimations. The term occasionally includes
even negative associations, but to analytically define the neutral term being
used in this paper, chapter three captures what is existentially meant by
shadow banking in China.
Next, adjustments to the base model are carefully presented and explained.
The implications of the adjusted model suggest a slight vulnerability of the
altered economy’s production after tightening of monetary policy. Simulated
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shocks to interest rate as well as production amplify the reaction of the fi-
nancial sector through different lending channels studied by Mazelis (2015).
When the modelled central bank raises the interest rate, banks reduce lend-
ing while shadow banks increase lending (Mazelis, 2015).
Structurally, this paper is divided into four main sections, excluding the intro-
duction and concluding remarks. The second chapter discusses the literature
behind DSGE modelling, banking and shadow banking in the financial sec-
tor, and the main sources of influence for this paper. Then, the brief history
of the development of the banking sector in China is studied and, via the
banking reforms, the current financial frictions are considered. Furthermore,
the concept of Chinese shadow banking is discussed in more detail. The
fourth chapter consists of studying the DSGE model of Falk Mazelis (2015)
and presenting the first order conditions, equilibrium, and the solved steady
state with implications of the inclusion of shadow banking briefly examined.
As a conclusion to the main sections, the adjustments are introduced, ar-
gued, and analysed.
2 Literature
Being a rather new phenomenon, or a new topic of discussion to be more
precise, shadow banking has not yet extensively found its way to economic
models in financial sectors even though the volume of research on the matter
has risen in recent years. Few of the models introduced here are dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, dynamic due to economy
evolving over time and stochastic due to random shocks, such as macroeco-
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nomic policy shocks.
One of the largest errors related to forecasting economic crises deals with the
size of the shocks that impact the economy. Financial markets are imperfect
due to asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders, and costly en-
forcement of financial contracts, among many other things. During times of
extreme economic turbulence, non-linearities and non-stationarities are more
likely, which suggests an emphasis on non-linear models when analysing and
forecasting the impacts and effects of financial crises. (Geoff and Julian,
2011).
Many state-of-the-art DSGE models and other mainstream macroeconomic
models used in central banks for forecasting face criticism for having unreal-
istic assumptions, such as perfect information or rational expectations.Partial
or full exclusion of financial frictions and non-linear dynamics has also aroused
criticism. Moreover, non-linear models do not fit into economic analysis with-
out critique. It is probable to find good non-linear models to fit the data for
a given crisis, but during ”normal times” the models might not be beneficial
at all since they usually explain and emphasize features in data that occur
infrequently. (Geoff and Julian, 2011).
This chapter deals with mainly macroeconomic financial linear and non-linear
models, DSGE models and other types of models. Examined models are with
and without exogenous or endogenous shocks and with and without shadow
banking to map out previous literature on the subject.
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2.1 Modelling the Financial Sector
The volume of macroeconomic research on the financial sector has increased
after the sub-prime crisis, yet a variety of banking system structures have
existed in macroeconomic literature before the latest well known global crisis.
For instance, Jermann and Quadrini (2009) considered a financial sector that
can act as a source of the business cycle, proposing shocks that affect the
financial sector directly in addition to the propagation of shocks originating
in other economic sectors.
Temporary small financial shocks can have a potentially large impact on the
whole economy due to the time consuming net worth rebuild of indebted
agents of the economy, as well as an impact on financial constraints, as dis-
cussed by Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2013) in their creation of macroeco-
nomic model with a financial sector. The core of their model used two types
of agents, productive experts and less productive households, to examine the
equilibrium dynamics of an economy that occasionally faces volatile crisis
episodes due to nonlinear amplification effects. They studied the volatility
paradox in which endogenous risk persists in crisis, even if the exogenous
risks are at a very low level.
Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2013) describe a risk of experts having the abil-
ity to better hedge idiosyncratic risks among one another. Then they add
leverage making the economic system less stable. The result holds also when
intermediaries facilitate lending from households to experts. The model un-
derlines the importance of financial regulation subject to time and crisis
presence. Regulation restricting dividends should depend primarily on the
aggregate net worth of all intermediaries.
9
2.1.1 Monopolistic Banking Systems
The core interest of this paper, however, is concentrated on shadow banks,
but here monopolistic banking systems are also considered. The former is
discussed in the following subsection while the latter serves as an interesting
piece constructing the historical approach of the financial sector of China.
There are models comparing competitive banking and monopolistic banking
with rather different approaches and mixed findings, and the extent of liter-
ature of the comparison started widening at the turn of the century. General
equilibrium models propose that less competitive banks are harmful to the
economy while, for instance, Cetorelli (1995, 1997) suggests a monopoly bank
that facilitates technology adoption and reduces screening costs via explo-
ration of banking structure on adoption of technology, financing of credit-
constrained firms and screening processes for new loans. However, redistri-
bution of productive resources counterweights the benefits, and he states the
impact of monopoly in banking to be ambiguous (Cetorelli, 1995, 1997).
The antithesis of which kind of banking system is better for a given economy
is not black and white, and one has to keep in mind that there are numerous
completely different aspects of studying the two different financial systems.
Furthermore, the definition of ”good for economy” can be subject to a larger
debate. Boyd, De Nicolo´, and Smith (2003) were among the first ones to
discuss the comparison specifically in the case of an banking crisis. They
considered the relative probabilities of banking crises and output losses in
competitive versus monopolistic banking systems. One of the main factors
in their model is the rate of inflation which directly affects the nominal in-
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terest rate, and how the rate of inflation affects the probability of a banking
crisis contrasting the two systems.
According to their theoretical findings, the probability of a panic (a banking
crisis involving the suspensions of cash payments to depositors, depletion of
cash reserves, the emergence of a premium on currency, the use of emergency
expedients to provide substitutes for media of exchange) is related to some
threshold in the nominal interest rate. If the rate is below that threshold,
monopolistic banks have a higher probability of a panic than competitive
banks, and if the rate is above that threshold, competitive banks have a
higher probability of a panic than monopolistic banks. Additionally, if the
nominal interest rate increases so does the probabilities of a banking panic un-
der both competitive and monopolistic banking systems. (Boyd et al., 2003).
Empirical research hinted a positive correlation between the rate of growth of
real activity in an economy and the development of its financial sector. Guz-
man (2000) considers the equilibrium growth paths of two economies: one
with competitive banking and one with monopolistic banking ceteris pare-
bus, analyzing connections between credit rationing, capital accumulation,
monitoring, and development trap phenomena to capture interrelationships
between intermediation and growth.
According to Guzman (2000), monopolistic banking system decreases equi-
librium growth of capital stock for two possible reasons, assuming monopoly
banks have monopoly power in loan markets and deposit markets and choose
to exercise this power separately. Firstly, monopolistic banking system re-
sults in credit rationing more likely than competitive banking system and
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when credit rationing exists, monopolistic banks ration credit more exten-
sively. Secondly, without credit rationing the monopolistic banking system
monitors credit-financed investments excessively. (Guzman, 2000).
La Croce and Rossi (2015) discussed the endogenous firm entry in an econ-
omy with monopolistic competitive banks in a DSGE model and implied
that free entry results in higher volatilities of both real and financial vari-
ables. This contrasts a DSGE model that uses a fixed number of firms and
a monopolistic banking system.
2.1.2 Shadow Banking
Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2013) introduced a model of shadow banking
where banks create and trade loans, assembling them into diversified portfo-
lios and financing these portfolios with riskless debt. The demand for riskless
debt is driven by outside investor wealth. They build on their previous pro-
duction model of Gennaioli et al. (2012) and present a model that describes
securitization without any risk transfer outside the core banks. The process
of diversifying idiosyncratic risk while concentrating banks’ exposure to sys-
tematic risk enables them to expand their balance sheets by funding carry
trades with riskless debt.
Gennaioli et al. (2013) portray financial crises as man-made disasters, which
implies that they occur more frequently than in a neoclassical framework,
where market participants minimize the risks of default and bankruptcy.
The model implies also that during the latest financial crisis market partici-
pants were not fully aware of risks being taken.
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Ferrante (2015) modelled how introducing shadow banks as an additional
banking sector can make the economy more unstable even though credit
availability is increased. In the model, intermediaries, traditional banks and
shadow banks can originate risky projects (loans), but asymmetric informa-
tion about the loans that banks fund affects the limit of the amount raised
by outside investors. Traditional banks and shadow banks react differently
to the agency-information problem. Ferrante (2015) states that the shadow
banking sector amplifies exogenous shocks as it increases the aggregate lever-
age of the financial sector.
A DSGE macroeconomic model of a monetary policy shocks in the bank-
ing sector extended with a shadow banking sector by Verona, Martins and
Drumond (2011) was motivated by the sub-prime crisis. Without any solid
evidence of causal connection between excessively loose monetary policy and
the sub-prime crisis, the model builds upon strong correlation between the
two. It assumes that the financial sector has a central role piloting the boom
and bust business cycles we are experiencing today (Verona et al., 2011).
Merged from the Real Business Cycle (RBC) models and the New Keynesian
sticky-price models, the DSGE models of today do not put significant weight
on credit creation in the financial markets. The Verona et al. (2011) DSGE
model with shadow banking system (VMD model) aims to shift the atten-
tion from financial frictions caused by the behaviour of borrowers towards
analysing financial intermediaries themselves. This is done by composing the
micro-founded financial system of two different financial intermediaries; retail
banks and investment banks, both which intermediate funds from households
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(lenders) to two sets of entrepreneurs (borrowers).
In the model of Verona et al. (2011) the two sets of bankers face two different
principal-agent problems between the borrowers and the lenders: retail banks
face an agency-information problem in which information is asymmetric and
the realized return is observed by the entrepreneurs with no cost, but the
retail banks observe it only after monitoring cost. This agency problem is
similar to the one introduced in the Ferrante (2015) model earlier. The ex-
tended shadow banking sector introduces an agency-money problem in which
the investment bank manager faces incentives of side payments to boost his
private revenue at the expense of stockholders’ profits, converting a fraction
of stockholders’ profits for his own benefit. The model seeks to answer ques-
tions such as how do these perverse incentives in the financial sector affect
the transmission of monetary policy shocks through the economy comparing
findings to other DSGE models, and does policy of too low interest rates for
too long cause a boom-bust cycle. As well as the effects of the combination
of these two; perverse incentives in the financial sector with the persistently
low interest rate environment.
Funke, Mihaylovski and Haibin (2015) used a non-linear DSGE model to dis-
tinguish the different of reactions to monetary policy by commercial banks
and shadow banks. They examined the effects and impacts of interest rate
liberalization and the dynamics of the parallel shadow banking sector, iden-
tifying opposite reactions of shadow banks and commercial banks towards
contractionary monetary policy: shadow banks grow while commercial banks
retrench.
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Another DSGE model that integrates the shadow banking sector and yields
similar results as the Funke et al. (2015) model is a model by Falk Mazelis
(2015), which is examined further in this paper. His model is a follow-up
on the monetary DSGE model of Mark Gertler and Peter Karadi (2011)
with financial intermediaries. The Gertler-Karadi (2011) model (GK model)
simulates financial crisis and focuses on the effect of central banks’ uncon-
ventional monetary policy and the endogenous balance sheet constraints of
private financial intermediaries. The balance sheet constraints on private
intermediaries tighten during a crisis and the central banks -which are not
balance sheet constrained- raise the net benefits from intermediation due to
their ability to elastically obtain funds by issuing riskless government debt.
The GK model analysis suggests that the net benefits of the unconventional
monetary policy diminish as the economy returns to normal and financial
intermediaries re-capitalise. This with effects outside the model, such as
”politicisation” of credit allocation in normal times, should make unconven-
tional monetary policy suitable only for crisis situations (Gertler and Karadi,
2011). Mazelis (2015) model adds a second financial intermediation sector to
the GK model, a shadow banking sector, that issues loans to firms. Consid-
ering the crisis-oriented motive for this paper, the framework presented here
works as a good layout for the DSGE approach.
Distinguishing between banks and shadow banks and their funding con-
straints, Mazelis (2015) proposes that banks’ reaction to monetary policy
shocks corresponds with the balance sheet channel while shadow banks’ re-
action to shocks is better explained by the lending channel since they are
constrained by the funding available to them. Mazelis proposed the same
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impact as Funke et al. (2015), that banks and shadow banks react differently
to monetary policy shocks: when tightening monetary policy occurs, regular
banks reduce the amount of loans on their balance sheets while shadow banks
increase lending (Mazelis, 2015).
Studying the monetary transmission channel and how credit intermediation
of shadow banks affect the aggregate loan supply to monetary policy, the
Mazelis model (2015) examines the contribution of the shadow banking sec-
tor to macroeconomic fluctuations. In the model, commercial banks create
credit endogenously and shadow banks raise funds from households to be able
to loan to firms. These funds are available to shadow banks by households’
incentive to save instead of consuming due to an increase in the monetary
policy rate, decreasing the willingness of banks to lend. This leads to the
constraints described.
2.2 Mechanism of Monetary Policy
The main objective of this paper is to capture the effect of Chinese econom-
ical characteristics has towards an economy with modelled shadow banking
sector. Therefore, this paper focuses on the DSGE model of Mazelis (2015),
which is based on US data, and constructs a variation that aims to capture
the characteristics of banking and shadow banking with Chinese economical
tendencies. This is done by slightly adjusting the parameters and the mon-
etary policy of the model. The minor adjustments to parameters focus on a
production parameter, a depreciation parameter, a banking parameter and a
shadow banking parameter. These adjustments represent hints of economical
properties of an economy with Chinese characteristics.
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Chen, Funke, Lozev and Tsang (2020) build a DSGE model with commercial
banking sector analysing the effects of a ”window guidance” tool by the reg-
ulatory policy of PBoC introduced in 1998. Chen et al. (2020) discusses the
aim of PBoC to focus its monetary policy on the quantity of money rather
than the price, while slowly shifting the focus towards monetary policy sim-
ilar to western central banks.
The DSGE modelling of Chen et al. (2020) suggest a welfare tradeoff in
stimulating monetary policy by the window guidance tool kit having negative
welfare effects in certain cases. This paper uses the Chen et al. (2020) DSGE
model monetary policy of PBoC as a foundation, but disregards the window
guidance as a nonstandard monetary policy tool. The standard monetary
tool in the Chen et al. (2020) model contains the Taylor rule with PBoC
targeting gradually to a specific interest rate and inflation. The parameters
are calibrated to match key features of the Chinese economy hence it is used
in the variation to replace the monetary policy in the Mazelis (2015) model.
The next chapter will discuss the essence of China’s financial sector by out-
lining important historical progress and debating current financial issues, and
the specific adjustments introduced here are detailed in chapter five.
3 Financial Sector of PDR China
3.1 Banking Sector
The incomprehensible growth of China’s banking sector is a corollary of the
step-by-step opening of a formerly closed socialist economy as well as tremen-
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dous economic growth. Simultaneously, the economy, as observed through
the banking sector, has remained largely state-owned. After WWII and a
civil war that coincided with the foundation of the People’s Republic of China
in 1949, the financial sector was controlled by one bank, the People’s Bank
of China (PBoC). Consolidated from Huabei Bank, Beihai Bank and Xibei
Farmer Bank, the PBoC acted as the central bank and tool of monetary
policy as well as all commercial banking operations. After the economic re-
forms in the 1970’s and 1980’s and the creation of the Bank of China (BOC)
(formerly a non-deposit taking division of PBoC), few new banks were estab-
lished and the new core of China’s banking system along with BOC consisted
of the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), China Construction Bank (CCB,
formerly The People’s Construction Bank of China) and The Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). These became also known as the Big
Four. It was after a decent period of huge economic growth and a sturdy and
efficient retrenchment of poverty when the banking sector expanded greatly
and the number of Chinese banks rose to triple-digits, with numerous banks
serving the vast rural areas of the country.
China’s economic growth is heavily based on savings and investment, and
what distinguishes it from other similar economies and former economies,
such as the socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, is that the
banking sector is tightly operated by domestic banks, whereas many social-
ist economies let foreign banks to enter their financial market. Bank loans
remain the most important source of external funding for the non-financial
sector in China, and the share of total financing decreased to 14 % in 2011
from 20 % in 2004. However, banks’ financing of investments increased in
absolute terms from RMB 1,278 billion to RMB 3,364 billion during the
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same period, revealing a glimpse of a vivid expansion of the financial sector.
(Fungacova-Korhonen, 2011).
This historical approach lays ground for adjusting the model as well as rea-
sons the motives behind the adjustment approach. The section is divided
into consideration of the core banking in the financial sector and the birth
of shadow banking on top of it.
3.1.1 Banking Reforms and State-ownership
This vast expansion was predated by major banking reforms. These re-
forms became necessary as a banking system that was neither competitive
nor market-based led to a period that included significant amounts of non-
performing loans (roughly 20 % of all loans).
The Big Four was created to supply credit to mainly state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs) but since SOEs were usually not profit-driven, defaults on their
loans followed preventing banks from credit creation with high-risk high-yield
projects. The Big Four served, without decision-making powers, under the
Ministry of Finance until 1986. Meanwhile, the number of loss-making SOEs
increased enormously during 1980’s and after 1990’s, forcing the government
to reform the banking industry. (Kumbhakar-Wang, 2007).
Ten new banks were established in the 1980’s. Only one of them was pri-
vately owned and the remaining were owned privately and by the state. For
simplicity, let us call these ten banks the joint-equity banks of the bank-
ing reform, since they were set to form the private banking sector of China
in the long-term, and each of the Big Four had initially separate funding
purposes for constructing and maintaining a future market-driven economy.
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Gradually implemented policies to improve the efficiency of Chinese banks
were put in place, and Kumbhakar-Wang (2007) studied the efficiency and
total factor productivity (TFP) change in 14 national Chinese banks during
a sample period of 1993-2002. Large banking reforms were implemented dur-
ing this period, and the study reveals an annual TFP growth of 4.4 %, 5.5
% in joint-equity banks and 1.4 % in state-owned banks. This suggests that
state-owned banks are less efficient.
Recent studies of Chinese banks’ efficiency after the 1994 banking reform
expose some variety of results. The Big Four were found to be less effi-
cient, less profitable and had worse asset quality than other types of banks,
as discovered by Lin-Zhang (2009) with a regression analysis applied over a
period between 1997-2007. Jiang et al. (2009) found with a stochastic dis-
tance function that technical efficiency of Chinese banks has improved during
1995-2005. Time periods of these studies include China joining the World
Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. A consensus exists regarding joint-
equity banks having better profitability than state-owned banks in China.
The empirical evidence of how the nature of ownership affects bank effi-
ciency is rather mixed. Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) studied state-owned
banks in India and discovered them to be more efficient than private banks,
whereas Fries-Taci (2005) studied cost and profit efficiency of 289 banks in
15 Eastern European post-communist countries and found that most foreign-
owned private banks were the most efficient, compared to relatively less effi-
cient domestic-owned private banks and the least efficient state-owned banks.
These studies suggest that bank efficiency is more dependent on institutional
environment and other economic factors than the nature of ownership.
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The structures of ownership in Chinese banks have undergone changes after
the reform period, but still more than 90 % of bank assets in China are owned
by the state. State-ownership dominates the ownership structure of the Big
Four in China as ICBC, CCB, BOC, and ACB are at least 60 % state-owned
by nature (Fungacova-Korhonen, 2011). In addition, China has harnessed the
independent regulator model as an instrument of governance. A model of a
regulator independent from business in private and state-owned enterprises
and advocated widely by large international organizations, the independent
regulator model has been a tool to enhance the value of state-owned assets
in China, and rather than releasing the bureaucratic grip of the government
on companies, it actually tightened it.
Since 1992, China’s State Council has established new regulatory commis-
sions in financial services such as banking, securities, and insurance. For
example, by 2003 three regulatory bodies had been established in financial
services: China Securities Regulatory Commission, China Insurance Regula-
tory Commission, and China Banking Regulatory Commission. These bodies
regulate fields of the financial sector that were formerly regulated by PBoC.
This is a good example of socialist market economy with Chinese character-
istics; dominated and regulated by the public sector, maximizing efficiency
with antitrust laws and consumer protection fostering competition, thus min-
imizing the occurrence of market failures. (Pearson, 2005).
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3.1.2 Financial Deregulation
China, as the world’s second largest economy, has rather successfully re-
formed from a state-controlled economy to a market-oriented economy. How-
ever, the financial sector’s reforms have been slower and somewhat unsuccess-
ful in terms of the future of gradually liberalized interest rates. Lending rates
were fully liberated in 2013 and deposit rates in 2015, but banks have had
a difficult time adjusting to the new environment since the whole financial
sector has historically leaned on easy credit. This challenge has been espe-
cially present in SOEs as well as government-backed institutions and entities.
The historical economic growth has been strengthened with the reduction of
cost of capital, which has been made possible by implementing low, admin-
istratively controlled interest rates and artificially high savings rates, thus
boosting the economy that is dominated by SOEs. Policies on levelling the
playing field between SOEs and private companies is an increasing topic of
discussion in the Chinese financial sector, as more privately owned agents
are entering the still heavily state-owned market. The economy, however, is
currently in an unsustainable equilibrium of inefficient allocation of capital,
maintained by high national savings that cover the losses, but the inevitable
adjustment occurs when the supporting and buffering actions are exhausted
or become exhausted. (Anzoategui et al., 2015).
Implicit guarantees and interest rate controls are distortions that have led
the economy to this point, and for capital allocation to improve, thus making
debt sustainable, the key is to remove these distortions. Implicit guarantees,
referring to a privileged access to credit due to creditors’ assumption of im-
plicit support by the government, are still a major problem in the Chinese
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financial market. The problem exists even though the interest rate controls
are now more or less freed by the Third Plenum reform blueprint which aims
to deal with these distortions. The government has let some loans of SOEs to
default to test the ground, but for example bond default is a rarity in China,
and clear evidence exists of bailing out creditors in the event of lending to
implicitly guaranteed enterprise has gone south. (Anzoategui et al., 2015).
3.2 Shadow Banking Sector
Shadow Banking in China does not significantly differ from the biggest shadow
banking sector that is in the United States, which will be the main object of
comparison in this paper. The growth has been vast, as Standard & Poor’s
estimated an annual growth of 34 % over the period of 2010-2015 (Li, 2014).
Data from PBOC for 2011 stated that 58.3 % of system-wide financial ag-
gregate were bank loans and the rest (41.7 %) may be defined as shadow
banking loans. Furthermore, two-thirds of these shadow banking loans are
estimated to be operated by banks at the core of the transaction (Hsu and
Li, 2012) (Elliot and Yu, 2015).
The theory of shadow banking is rather young since the terminology started
developing in the 21st century, and it was only after the sub-prime crisis that
shadow banking entered the economic literature and macroeconomic models
more extensively. However, the extent of economic literature on shadow
banking is clearly not wide enough when the estimated magnitude of shadow
banking in several financial sectors is considered.
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3.2.1 Birth of Demand
As the financial system of China faced a turning point in the mid-1990s
when more than 20 % of loans were non-performing, and vast reforms in the
banking sector to harness profitable and well-capitalized banks succeeded a
decade later, the foundation for the demand for a shadow banking sector
was born. Preventing the banks to collapse, a policy in the form of regulated
interest rate system had a consequence of forcing households to endure ar-
tificially low interest rates on bank deposits. This, combined with Chinese
banks’ tendency to lend to large corporations while at least partially neglect-
ing small- and medium-sized companies (SMEs), a growing demand emerged
for a shadow banking system as an important channel for alternative funding
instruments. (Funke et al., 2015).
Shadow banking in China is very different due to a system controlled by large
state-owned banks, which are under the central bank, PBoC. However, the
main reason why shadow banking continues to grow globally remains roughly
the same in countries with commercial banking sector independent of state
ownership: the tightening regulation, requirements, and limits within the
banking sector.
Caps regulated by the PBoC, constricting a 75 % limit of banks loans to
deposits, lower capital and liquidity requirements, PBoC’s costly reserve re-
quirements are among the reasons why shadow banking is reasonable for
Chinese firms operating in the financial sector (Elliot and Yu, 2015). More-
over, a consumer seeking high risk and high yield, combined with a growing
proportion of people and small private sector businesses left outside of some
banking services, explains the boost of the demand for shadow banking.
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3.2.2 Size and Array
When estimating the size of the shadow banking system in China, one has
to remember that size estimates vary greatly and are utterly dependent on
the financial instruments included in the definition of shadow banking sector
as well as the fundamental viewpoint taken on the matter.
Standard & Poor’s has stated that China’s shadow banking credit grew at
an annual rate of 34 % between the end of 2010 and 2015 (Li, 2014). There
are plenty of estimates to grasp the size of the shadow banking sector, but
according to data from PBoC for 2011, banking loans from all-system financ-
ing aggregate covered 58.3 % and the rest is defined to be shadow financial
activity that covered 41.7 % (Hsu and Li, 2012). Depending on the definition
of shadow banking, as in what entities are included in the definition, the size
estimates vary greatly.
According to Elliot and Yu (2015), six reasonable estimates in the recent past
range from RMB 5 trillion to RMB 46 trillion, or roughly from 8 % to 80 % of
Gross Domestic Product of China. Comparing with similar basis of estima-
tion, Yu estimated China’s shadow banking size to be RMB 25 trillion (43 %
of GDP) in 2013, while the Financial Stability Board estimated that global
shadow banking assets comprise 120 % of global GDP and 150 % of GDP in
the US, with generally the estimated outstanding volume of shadow banking
in China ranging from 40 % of GDP to 60 % of GDP (Ueda and Gomi, 2013).
It is estimated that from this shadow financial activity, two-thirds are oper-
ations in which banks are at the core of the transaction. They assume most
of the risks and returns but pay a non-bank for participation, thus avoiding
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constraints and regulatory costs (Elliot and Yu, 2015).
To further particularize the definition, let us identify the transaction tools
used by shadow banking system in China. The use of one or more of the
following institutions, techniques or instruments deepen the understanding
of the shadow banking system in China. (Elliot and Yu, 2015)
Trust companies with loans and leases, and similar elements of banks and
asset managers, are Chinese financial firms generally included in the shadow
banking system. Entrusted loans are loans made on behalf of large corpora-
tions using banks or financial firms as intermediaries. The interbank version
of this kind of loan where one bank will act on behalf of another also counts as
shadow banking. Financial leasing, possibly provided by companies special-
izing on leasing, is not a short-term operating lease and not on the balance
sheet of a bank or trust company, and it is also included in the shadow bank-
ing system. (Elliot and Yu, 2015).
There are various micro finance companies that have the license to lend small
amounts to provide easy service for small and rural borrowers. To connect
the savers and users of funds, there are plenty of internet finance activities
including peer-to-peer (P2P) lending networks and crowd funding platforms.
Pawn shops, lending to many households and small businesses, serves similar
consumers and sometimes there can clearly be informal or illegal operations
by various unofficial lenders. (Elliot and Yu, 2015).
Guarantee companies may not have a legal license to provide direct loans, as
their main purpose is to provide guarantees that sometimes manage shadow
26
banking transactions. Derivative transactions such as trust beneficiary rights
(TBRs) are sometimes used by banks to move instrument similar to loan
into this category, as it is more favourably treated in the balance sheet, thus
retaining the economic benefits of a loan. When purchasing a TBR, the con-
sumer receives all or some proportion of the returns acquiring to the trust.
Wealth management products, such as hedge funds, are being used instead
of formal deposits due to higher expected returns. Large corporations use
finance subsidiaries to lend money to banks in a manner similar to deposits,
avoiding caps on deposit rates while the bank is not being forced to regulatory
costs of deposits. This kind of shadow banking activity is called inter-bank
market activities. (Elliot and Yu, 2015).
So, shadow banking in China includes a vast variety of financial activities
and even though some activity inside the bundle could be labelled negative,
such as illegal lending, the whole ensemble is considered a neutral term. It
interconnects aforementioned institutions, techniques and instruments into
a whole sector that is analysed in this paper. During the time of writing
this paper, the size of the shadow banking sector in China is not as large as
the biggest shadow banking sectors in the world, but due to its growth in
complexity and size, it has been recognized globally as a financial factor to
be considered.
4 The DSGE Model
Falk Mazelis of Humboldt University of Berlin constructed a DSGE model
with shadow banking, based on a monetary DSGE model with financial inter-
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mediaries of Gertler and Karadi (2011). This paper solves and examines the
subsequent Mazelis (2015) model to set up a foundation to renovate minor
adjustments to the model with specific interest to Chinese characteristics in
the general economy and the financial sector. There are six types of agents in
the Mazelis model. First, let us introduce the fundamental problems and the
basic settings of the agents and solve the basic first order conditions (FOCs),
and then expand and specify the model by examining the steady state.
4.1 Basic Setting of the Model
First, households that are spread evenly across [0, 1] and include 1 − f
workers consuming, saving and supplying labour and f (0 < f < 1) bankers
accumulating profits over several periods. Both maximize discounted lifetime
utility
max
Ct,Bt+1,Lt
Et
∞∑
i=0
βi[ln(Ct+i − hCt+ i− 1)− χ
HH
1 + ϕ
L1+ϕt+i .
This is the aggregate form with budget constraints sequence of period
Ct +Bt+1 + Tt = WtLt + Πt +R
w
t Bt
where Ct = consumption, Lt = unit of labour, Wt = real wage, Bt = sav-
ings (government bonds, deposits at banks, fund shares with shadow banks),
Tt = lump sum taxes R
w
t = weighted interest rate on savings, Πt = profits of
capital producers (banks and shadow banks), β = discount factor, h = habit
parameter, χHH = relative utility weight of labour and ϕ = inverse Frisch
elasticity and labour supply.
Denoting U(Ct, Lt) as the utility maximation-problem of the aggregated
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households, let us derive the first order conditions:
dU(Ct, Lt)
dCt
=
∑
i=0
(Ct − hCt−1)−1β0 + Et
∑
i=1
(Ct+1 − hCt)−1(−h)β1 − λHHt = 0
⇔ %t = (Ct − hCt−1)−1 − βhEt(Ct+1 − hCt)−1
dU(Ct, Lt)
dLt
=
χHH
1 + ϕ
(1 + ϕ)L1+ϕ−1t −Wt%t = 0⇔ Wt%t = χHHLϕt
From Euler condition
dU
dCt
= βEt[
dU
dCt+1
(1 + rt+1)]⇔ 1 = βEtΛt+1Rwt+1, Λt+1 =
dU
dCt+1
dU
dCt
, (
dU
dCt
= %t)
Banks are the second type of an agent in the model and their balance sheet
is given by
Nt+1 = Rkt+1QtSt −Rt+1Dt+1
= (Rkt+1 −Rt+1)QtSt +Rt+1Nt
since Dt+1 = QtSt − Nt. St = loan portfolio, Qt = price of the portfolio
thus price of capital, Nt = net worth of the bank, Dt+1 = deposits from
households, Rt+1 = interest paid for deposits, and Rkt+1 = rate of return for
loans. Banks maximize their expected terminal net wealth Vt before they exit
the industry with a probability θ per period. An agency problem to motivate
an endogenous constraint on banks’ ability to obtain funds is the fraction λt
of the loan portfolio a banker can divert and the depositors at the bank are
not able to recover. With the motivation of not declaring bankruptcy in a
given period, households keep their deposits at individual banks as long as
the franchise value of the bank Vt ≥ λtQtSt, the divertible amount. Vt is
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given by Vt = νtQtSt + ηtNt with
νt = Et[(1− θ)βΛt+1(Rkt+1 −Rt+1 + βΛt+1θxt+1vt+1],
ηt = Et[(1− θ) + βΛt+1zt+1θηt+1],
where zt+1 = is growth rate in net worth and xt+1 = growth rate in assets.
The size of a banker’s loan portfolio depends on the size of their net wealth
Vt = λtQtSt
νtQtSt + ηtNt = λtQtSt
QtSt(λt − νt) = ηtNt
QtSt =
ηt
λt − νtNt.
A financial measurement of capital in the form of debt and equity, the lever-
age ratio can be defined as
φt ≡ ηt
λt − νt .
The leverage ratio reacts to an economy-wide productivity endogenously, and
it is dependent on the borrowing rate and monetary policy. We can use that
to define growth rates zt+1 and xt+1:
zt+1 =
Nt+1
Nt
=
(Rkt+1 −Rt+1)QtSt +Rt+1Nt
Nt
=
(Rkt+1 −Rt+1)QtSt
Nt
+
Rt+1Nt
Nt
= (Rkt+1 −Rt+1)φt +Rt+1.
xt+1 =
Qt+1St+1
QtSt
=
φt+1Nt+1
φtNt
=
φt+1
φt
zt+1
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The third kind of agent is the shadow bank, which does not create credit
but sells fund shares FSt to households. As simple intermediaries shadow
banks can issue loans SSBt by
QtS
SB
t = FSt.
Shadow banks advertise their fund shares spending vt to gain a probability of
qt of a successful deposit by a household. This search and matching of fund
shares for deposits is depicted mainly by the assumed constant probability of
separation χSB. Search and matching theory in economics has numerous ap-
plications within labour economics as firm-worker matches, but applications
in monetary economics and financial systems have emerged in the recent past
as seller-buyer derivatives. Shadow banks maximize their discounted future
profits choosing fund advertisements and loan issuance:
max
vt,SSBt
Et
∞∑
i=0
βiΛt,t+iΠ
SB
t+i
where
ΠSBt = (Rkt −RSBt )Qt−1SSBt−1 − vt.
Let us define SB(vt, S
SB
t ) to be the maximization function. Fund shares
that have not been converted as well as new mathces from advertisement
generates the total funding of a shadow bank in period t. Shadow banks’
funding contraint of shadow banks is given by
FSt = (1− χSB)FSt−1 + qtvt ⇔ (1− χSB)Qt−1SSBt−1 −QtSSBt + qtvt = 0
dSB
dvt
= −1 + λSBt = 0⇔ λSBt =
1
qt
dSB
dSBt
= EtβΛt+1(Rkt+1 −Rt+1)Qt − λSBt Qt + EtβΛt+1λSBt+1(1− χSB)Qt = 0
λSBt = EtβΛt+1{(Rkt+1 −Rt+1) + λSBt+1(1− χSB)}
1
qt
= EtβΛt+1{(Rkt+1 −RSBt+1) + (1− χSB)
1
qt+1
}.
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Mazelis also introduces a shadow bank ability to issue repo (BSBt+1) similar
to bank deposits with the exception of that not every agent in the economy
accepts these credit claims as payment whereas every agent accepts banks
deposits. However, this extension of the Mazelis model (2015) is disregarded
in this paper.
The fourth type of agent is the goods producer which finances its capital by
borrowing from intermediaries. Goods producer is a firm with perfect com-
petition selling manufactured intermediate goods to the retailer. The lending
is capital constrained affecting the supply of funds to firms and the interest
rate for borrowing Rkt+1. The firm maximizes profits with the equation
K(Kt+1, Lt) = β max
Kt+1,Lt
Et
∞∑
i=0
βiΛt+1[PmtYt+(Qt−δ)ξtKt−WtLt−RktKtQt−1]
Yt = At(ξtKt)
αL1−αt , where α = capital share and 1− α = labour share.
Pmt = the relative output price of the intermediate good, Kt = capital, Qt =
the real price of capital, δ = depreciation rate, ξ = matching elasticity, and
Yt output. Marking Ψ = EtβΛt+1, we can solve the first order conditions
dK(Kt+1, Lt)
dKt+1
= ΨPmt+1αAt+1(ξt+1Kt+1)
α−1Lt+1 + Ψ(Qt − δ)ξt+1 −ΨRkt+1Qt = 0
Rkt+1Qt = Pmt+1α
Yt+1
Kt+1
+ (Qt+1 − δ)ξt
and solve the optimal capital for the next period by
Kt+1Rkt+1Qt = Pmt+1αYt+1 +Kt+1(Qt+1 − δ)ξt
Kt+1 =
Pmt+1αYt+1
Rkt+1Qt − (Qt+1 − δ)ξt
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And similarly for labour,
dK(Kt+1, Lt)
dLt
= ΨPmt(1− α)At(ξtKt)L1−α−1t −ΨWt = 0
⇔ Pmt(1− α)Yt
Lt
= Wt
Lt =
Pmt(1− α)Yt
Wt
The firms do not earn profits due to ex post returns going as interest pay-
ments to capital resulting in paying the profits out to the financial sector,
their creditors, thus the equation Kt+1 = St + S
SB
t .
Capital producers are the fifth type of agent in the model. They sell units
of new, refurbished capital left over from goods producers using input of final
output. They set the price Qt with the maximization problem of
max
Int
Et
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tΛt,τ{(Qt−1)Inτ−f( Inτ + ISS
Inτ−1 + ISS
)(Inτ+ISS), Int = Itµt−δξtKt
where µ = investment (Int) specific shocks, ISS = steady state value of
investments, denoting f( Inτ+ISS
Inτ−1+ISS
) by f(.), obeying f(1) = f ′(1) = 0, and
f ′′(1) > 0. First order condition for the price Qt is given by
Qt − 1− f ′(.) 1
Int−1 + ISS
(Int + ISS)− f(.)−Ψf ′(.)(Int+1 + ISS)(− 1
Int + ISS
)2(Int+1 + ISS) = 0
Qt = 1 + f(.) +
Int + ISS
Int−1 + ISS
f ′(.)− EtβΛt+1( Int + ISS
Int−1 + ISS
)2f ′(.).
Retailers who buy intermediate goods from goods producers at Pmt are the
sixth and final kind of agent in Mazelis model. They, f , produce the final
output and it is produced by
Yt = [
∫ 1
0
Y
−1

ft dx]
−1
 ,
which is a CES composite of continuum and where  = elasticity of substi-
tution. Users of final output minimize costs, and the retailers choose their
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reset price P ∗t by the maximization problem
max
P ∗t
Et
∞∑
i=0
γiβiΛt+1[
P ∗t
Pt+i
i∏
k=1
(1 + pit+k−1)γp − Pmt+i]Yft+i
with FOC
Et
∞∑
i=0
γiβiΛt+1[
P ∗t
Pt+i
i∏
k=1
(1 + pit+k−1)γp − 
− 1Pmt+i]Yft+i = 0
The price level evolution is given by
Pt = [(1− γ)(P ∗t )1− + γ(Πγpt−1Pt−1)1−]1/(1−),
where γ is a probability that each retailer can reset prices each period. Oth-
erwise they index their prices to lagged inflation. Thus, the intermediate
goods price Pmt and inflation pit follow a calvo contract pricing model. The
endogenous variables related to calvo pricing are specified and solved in the
steady state section.
The government is depicted by
Yt = Ct + vt + It + f(
Int + ISS
Int−1 + ISS
)(Int + ISS) +Gt,
which is the aggregate resource constraint. Taylor rule characterizes the
monetary policy with it = (1−ρ)[iSS +κpipit+κy(logYt− logY ∗t )] +ρit−1 + ei,
where nominal interest rate it depends on steady state interest rate iSS,
the natural rate of output logY ∗t , an interest rate smoothing parameter p,
inflation coefficient kpi and output coefficient ky. The exogenous shock to
monetary policy ei has an effect through the economy via the Fisher relation
1 + it = RtEt(1 + pit+1)
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4.2 Model Variables and Shocks
The steady state of the model can be solved with the first order conditions
by perturbation methods of Dynare (2011) around the deterministic steady
state. Uniting and complementing the agents’ problems in the economy, there
are altogether 41 endogenous variables of interest with seven shock variables
to be included in the steady state calculation methods of Dynare and they
are: output Yt, wholesale Ymt, consumption Ct, capital Kt, labour Lt, wages
Wt, investment It, net investment Int, depreciation rate δt, marginal utility
of consumption %t, stochastic discount rate Λt, utility Ut, savings Bt, bank
deposits Dt, banks loans St, aggregate net worth of banks Nt, net worth of
new banks Nnt, net worth of existing banks Net, value of banks’ net wealth
ηt, value of banks’ capital νt, growth rate of banks’ capital zt, growth rate of
banks’ net wealth xt, optimal leverage φt, shadow bank loans S
SB
t , price of
capital Qt, deposit interest rate Rt, borrowing rate Rkt, shadow banks’ fund
rate RSBt , the weighted interest rate of banks and shadow banks R
w
t , shadow
banks’ fund share vacancy postings FSt, price of shadow bank advertising vt,
probability of shadow bank matching funds qt, matching function of shadow
banks Θt, policy rate it, inflation pit, price dispersion Dpt, retail output price
Pmt, optimal price choice with pi
∗
t , Ft, and Zt, and the government spending
via lump-sum tax Gt.
The characterizing equations are log-linearised around the steady state to
examine percentage-change more effectively, but they are expressed here in
linear form for presentational purposes. The initial values of the endogenous
variables serve as base of operations for Dynare (2011) and for this paper are
probed with numerical solver-scripts with model parameters.
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The endogenous shock variables are total-factor productivity (TFP) shockAt,
capital quality shock ξt, government spending shock Gsht, shock to banks’
net wealth Nst, shock to banks’ divertible share (leverage) λt, investment
efficiency shock µt, shock to shadow banks’ fund shares FSsht, and they en-
ter the model via their exogenous standard deviations eA, eξ, eG, eNe, eλ,
eµ, eFS, respectively, alongside with an additional monetary policy shock ei.
All of these shocks are 0 in the steady state (log-linearised as a factor of 1)
except the shock variable λt which is defined as a positive number in the
steady state, λ.
4.3 Equilibrium
The characterizing equations (their number should be exactly the same as
the number of endogenous variables in the model dynare-script) specify the
model and act as a foundation for the steady state. The equations are con-
structed from Mazelis (2015) and Gertler-Karadi (2011) DSGE models and
are defined as:
(i) Production output subject to the (technological) total-factor productivity
(TFP) shock, At and the capital quality shock ξt:
Yt = At(ξtKt)
αL1−αt ,
(ii) Euler equation of household consumption:
βRwt Λt+1 = 1,
(iii) Stochastic discount rate:
Λt =
%t
%t+1
,
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(iv) Marginal utility of consumption:
%t = (Ct − hCt−1)−1 − βh(Ct+1 − hCt)−1,
(v) Labour market clearance (FOC of labour):
χHHLϕt = %tPmt(1− α)
Ymt
Lt
,
(vi) Return to capital (FOC of goods producer):
Rkt =
Pmtα
Ymt
Kt−1
+ (Qt − δt)
Qt−1
,
(vii) Fisher relation:
it = Rtpit+1 ↔ Rt = it
pit+1
,
(viii) Net investment subject to the investment shock µt and the capital
quality shock ξt:
Int = Itµ− δtξtKt−1,
(ix) Capital & investment subject to the capital quality shock ξt:
Kt = ξtKt−1 + Int,
(x) The price of capital, optimal investment decision:
Qt = 1+
η
2
(
Int + ISS
Int−1 + ISS
)2−η(( Int + ISS
Int−1 + ISS
)−1)−βΛt+1((Int+1 + ISS
Int + ISS
)−1)(Int+1 + ISS
Int + ISS
)2,
(xi) Policy, Taylor rule subject to the interest policy shock ei:
it = i
ρ
t−1
((
1
β
)
piκpit
(
1
p

−1
)κy)1−ρ
ei.,
(xii) Government consumption subject to the government consumption shock
Gsht:
Gt = GssGsht,
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(xiii) The aggregate resource constraint:
Yt = Ct + vt + It +
η
2
(
Int + ISS
Int−1 + ISS
)2(Int + ISS) +Gt,
(xiv) Optimal price choice (Calvo):
Ft = YtPmt + βγΛt+1pi

t+1pi
(−γp)
t Ft+1,
(xv) Optimal price choice (Calvo):
Zt = Yt + βγΛt+1pi
−1
t+1pi
γp(1−)
t Zt+1,
(xvi) Optimal price choice (Calvo):
pi∗t =

− 1
Ft
Zt
pit,
(xvii) Calvo price index (inflation), the New Keynesian Philips Curve:
pi1−t = γpi
γp(1−)
t−1 + (1− γ)pi∗1−t ,
(xviii) Price dispersion:
Dpt = γDpt−1pi
−γp
t−1 pi

t + (1− γ)
1− γ(piγp(1−γ)t−1 piγ−1t )
(1− γ) −1−γ
,
(xix) Depreciation rate:
δt = δ +
b
1 + ζ
U1+ζt ,
(xx) Optimal capacity utilization rate:
Pmtα
Ymt
Ut
= bU ζtKt−1,
(xxi) Arbitrage:
βΛt+1Rkt+1 = βΛt+1Rt+1,
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(xxii) Wholesale, the Retailers’ output:
Ymt = YtDpt,
(xxiii) Wages:
Wt = Pmt(1− α)Ymt
Lt
,
(xxiv) Optimal leverage ratio subject to the shock variable λt:
φt =
ηt
λt − νt ,
(xxv) Aggregate net worth of banks:
Nt = Net +Nnt,
(xxvi) Net worth of new banks:
Nnt = ωQtKt−1,
(xxvii) Net worth of existing banks subject to the bank value shock Nst:
Net = NstθztNt−1,
(xxviii) Growth rate of banks’ capital:
zt = (Rkt −Rt)φt−1 +Rt,
(xxix) Growth rate of banks’ net wealth
xt =
φt
φt−1
zt,
(xxx) Value of banks’ net wealth:
ηt = (1− θ) + βΛt+1Zt+1θηt+1,
(xxxi) Value of banks’ capital:
νt = (1− θ)βΛt+1(Rkt+1 −Rt) + βΛt+1θxt+1νt+1,
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(xxxii) Loan portfolio of banks:
St =
φtNt
Qt
,
(xxxiii) Banks’ balance sheet:
Dt = Qt−1St−1 −Nt−1,
(xxxiv) Weighed interest rate from holdings of deposits and fund shares:
Rwt = Rt
Dt
Bt
+RSBt
FSt
Bt
,
(xxxv) Definition of fund shares subject to fund share quantity shock FSsht
FSt = (1− χSB)FSt−1 + qtvt + FSsht,
(xxxvi) Euler condition for fund adverts:
1
qt
= βΛt+1[(Rkt+1 −RSBt+1) + (1− χSB)]
1
qt+1
,
(xxxvii) Financial intermediaries profit to creditors:
Kt+1 = St + S
SB
t ,
(xxxviii) Interest rate of shadow banks:
RSBt = (1− ωHH)Rt+1 + ωHH(Rkt + θt),
(xxxix) Probability of shadow bank finding a suitable funding:
qt = sθ
−ξ
t ,
(xl) Matching function of shadow banks:
θt =
vt
Dt+1 − FSt ,
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(xli) Savings definition:
Bt = FSt +Dt,
And in addition to the steady state characteristic equations, the shock vari-
able equations:
(xlii) TFP shock:
At = ρAAt−1 + eA,
(xliii) Capital quality shock:
ξt = ρξξt−1 + eξ,
(xliv) Government spending shock:
Gsht = ρGGsht−1 + eG,
(xlv) Bank value shock:
Nst = ρNeNst−1 + eNe,
(xlvi) Shadow bank fund share quantity shock:
FSsht = ρFSFSsht−1 + eFS,
(xlvii) Banks’ leverage ratio shock:
λt = (1− ρλ)λ+ ρλλt−1 + eλ,
(xlviii) Investment quality shock:
µt = ρµµt−1 + eµ.
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4.4 Parameter Values
Parameter estimation, such as Bayesian estimation, and calibration methods,
such as matching second moments, are disregarded in this paper and all the
calibrated parameters in the base model and few shock process parameters
are taken as given, sourced from Gertler-Karadi (2011). The steady state val-
ues of investment and government spending, Iss, and Gss, respectively, are
also considered as parameters to marginally predefine the steady state. The
parameters related to shadow banking and rest of the shocks process param-
eters are taken from the posterior modes of Mazelis (2015) model bayesian
estimation for parameters.
The values, descriptions and sources of the base model parameters are de-
picted in table 1 and the similarly for parameters in the shock processes in
table 2.
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Table 1: Parameters of the Model
Parameter Description Value Source
Households, Banks, and Labour
β Discount rate 0.99 GK11
h Habit parameter 0.815 GK11
ϕ Inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply 0.276 GK11
θ Bank survival probability 0.972 GK11
α Capital share of output 0.33 GK11
δ Static depreciation rate 0.02071939 GK11
b Depreciation rate parameter 0.0376 GK11
ζ Elasticity of marginal depreciation respect to utilization rate 7.2 GK11
η Elasticity of investment adjustment cost 1.728 GK11
ω Proportional starting up funds for banks 0.02 GK11
χhh Labour utility weight 3.409 GK11
Monetary Policy
ρ Interest rate smoothing parameter 0.8 GK11
κpi Inflation coefficent 1.5 GK11
κy Output gap coefficent -0.215 GK11
Retail Firms & Inflation
 Elasticity of substitution between goods 4.167 GK11
γ Calvo parameter 0.779 GK11
γp Price indexation parameter 0.241 GK11
Steady State Values
Iss Investment at steady state 0.14153927 GK11
Gss Government spending at steady state 0.16975710 GK11
Shadow Bank Parameters
χSB Separation rate in fund share matching 0.1 M15
ωHH Divertibility, household bargaining power 0.02 M15
s Fund matching efficiency 4.6 M15
ξ Fund matching elasticity 0.87 M15
43
Table 2: Shock Variable Parameters
Parameter Description Value Source
Shock Processes
ρA Persistency of TFP shock 0.95 GK11
ρξ Persistency of capital quality shock 0.66 GK11
ρG Persistency of government spending shock 0.95 GK11
ρλ Persistency of bank divertible share shock 0.61 M15
λ Fraction of bank assets that can be diverted 0.381 GK11
ρNe Persistency of bank net wealth shock 0.16 M15
ρFS Persistency of shadow bank fund share redemption shock 0.76 M15
ρµ Persistency of investment efficiency shock 0.63 M15
4.5 Implications of the Base Model
Mazelis (2015) used the GK (2011) model for most of the structural pa-
rameters of the model since it is built upon that model, and estimated the
new parameters mainly of the shadow banking sector using calibration and
Bayesian estimation. This section covers some implications Mazelis (2015)
made on his model study.
He analysed how monetary policy shocks propagate through the economy
with two different scenarios: with shadow banks and without them. An un-
expected monetary policy tightening (monetary policy shock) causes govern-
ment bonds to increase. In the scenario without shadow banks, banks raise
interest rates on deposits to keep the savings of the depositors, affecting the
net worth of firms with a reduction of net present value of future opera-
tions. Capital demand decreases and the price of the capital and investment
reduces due to least productive firms exiting the market. Savings increase
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and consumption decrease, thus reducing prices and putting more pressure
for capital demand for production to decrease. In the scenario with shadow
banks, the initial reaction for the shock is the same but shadow banks ne-
gotiate the fund rate over their expected profits and households’ alternative
savings. Borrowing rate and the deposit rate rise, making the fund rate rise,
and due to the borrowing rate increasing more than the funds rate, shadow
banks increase advertisement expenditures and offer more credit. This di-
minishes the fall of investment since shadow banks replace some of the lost
credit which strongly reduces capital decumulation.
The reason for these different lending reactions to monetary policy described
earlier are the different constraints. A bank is willing to extend credit as long
as a borrower is likely to be able to pay a high enough interest rate at a given
risk, where the amount of lending depends on the leverage ratio and the net
worth of the bank which are affected by the firm’s ability to borrow. This is
the essential of the balance sheet channel of monetary policy transmission.
Shadow banks have the constraint on their ability to acquire funds. When
savings increase, the amount of funds available to shadow banks increase.
This is the essential to the lending channel. The reality is, of course, much
more complicated than a simple separation in theory. Many shadow banks
are subsidiaries of commercial banks or banks themselves are in the core of
shadow banking activity. Furthermore, many financial products that com-
mercial banks offer are comparable to the lending channel, such as long-term
saving deposits or other products that are not immediately with-drawable by
the saver. (Mazelis, 2015).
After a monetary policy tightening shock banks reduce lending and shadow
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banks increase lending reducing the real effects of the shock, but at the same
time shadow banks amplify the reaction of key variables to real shocks and
can make the financial sector and the whole economy more unstable.
5 Altering the Model
The idea behind the changes is to slightly alter the model parameters and
monetary policy rule towards an economy with more Chinese characteristics
as introduced in chapter two. The direction and magnitude of the model
adjustments are motivated and the implications examined with the idea of
providing areas for further research. Drastic conclusions should not be made
based on such minor adjustments, merely observations of educating effects
of adjusting and tuning the model.
The main focus of this analysis is to run a productivity shock, an interest
rate shock and an investment shock through the economy and simulate im-
pulse response functions (IRFs) for output, consumption, capital, bank loans,
investment, shadow bank loans, the interest rate, inflation and labour and
compare the results with the model without adjustments towards Chinese
characteristics.
This section is divided into two parts: The first will introduce and argue
the altered model segments bundling them into previous discussion of the
Chinese financial sector, and the second part will examine the effects and
implications of the adjustment.
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5.1 The Adjustments
The monetary policy in the original model is modified because one of the
focal points in the model analysis is the monetary policy shock and due to
PBoC’s slightly different historical approach towards monetary policy and
targeting inflation, the original monetary policy is reshaped based on Chen
et al. (2020). In addition, four parameters in the original model are ad-
justed, α (capital share), δ (depreciation), θ (bank survival probability) and
χSB (shadow bank separation rate) with the idea of small-scale revision of
general economic elements (capital share and depreciation) and the financial
sector (banks and shadow banks).
The log-linearised version of the monetary policy with parameter estimated
natural rate of output and interest rate smoothing in the base model is
it = i
ρ
t−1
((
1
β
)
piκpit
(
1
p

−1
)κy)1−ρ
ei.
This is altered to the targeted inflation monetary policy with slight parameter
adjustments:
it = i
1−φi
ss i
φi
t−1
((
pit
piss
)φpi ( yt
yt−1
)φy)1−φi
ei.
The new parameters introduced in the targeted monetary policy and the ad-
justed parameters of the model can be found detailed in table 3. The original
and altered monetary policy rules share a similar structure. With iss ∼ 1β ,
and ρ ∼ φi, the distinction comes from the right hand terms of
(
1
p

−1
)κy
altered to
(
yt
yt−1
)φy
and piκpit to
(
pit
piss
)φpi
. Parameter values for κy and φy are
vastly different and they serve a different purpose. The original monetary
policy rule output gap is derived entirely from parameters where the altered
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rule smooths towards the gap dynamically from the growth rate of yt to the
power of φy. The steady state value of the inflation is log-linearised to unity
hence the targeting difference is captured in the difference of the values of
κpi and φpi. φpi > κpi thus an economy with more Chinese characteristics is
targeting higher inflation. Models with steady state of inflation deviating
from unity will have more dynamic value in the inflation growth pattern.
The main idea behind the adjusted parameters is to argue the direction of
the adjustments, not necessarily the absolute value, since DSGE model in
economical sense are delicate to major modifications in the steady state due
to Dynare steady state requirements. Thus, the altered model is not sup-
posed to be a completely new model, just a slight deviation from the original
steady state and processes.
The adjustment of the capital share of output, α reflects a slight increase to
its original value due to data and previous literature. For example, Funke et
al (2015) and Chen et al. (2020) used a DSGE models to design and anal-
yse Chinese economical issues and both papers use capital share of α = 0.5,
which is originally calibrated in Funke and Paetz (2012), a DSGE framework
analysis evaluating Chinese financial reform initiatives and proposals. Ac-
cording to World Bank data (2020) the 20-year average of Chinese capital
share of output is 0.424.
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Table 3: New and Adjusted Parameters
Parameter Description Value New Value Source
New Monetary Policy Parameters
φi Interest rate inertia towards target rate 0.8177 - CHEN20
φy Output gap parameter 0.8269 - CHEN20
φpi Inflation parameter towards targeted inflation 1.7584 - CHEN20
iss Steady state value of the nominal interest rate 0.0100501 - MODEL
piss Steady state value of the inflation 0 - MODEL
Adjusted Parameters
α Capital share of output 0.33 0.375 Orig. GK11
δ Static depreciation rate 0.02071939 0.035 Orig. GK11
θ Bank survival probability 0.972 0.9775 Orig. GK11
χSB Separation rate in fund share matching 0.1 0.078 Orig. M15
In DSGE models the depreciation is occasionally considered an estimated pa-
rameter, a calculated parameter or a process (variable). In the original model
the process of δt witness here an adjustment to the parameter δ mainly due
to open platform data of Knoema (2020) suggesting that the average 10-year
depreciation is 0.05, which is the base of increasing δ.
The adjustments in the financial sector, θ, and χSB are more theoretical. Due
to the implicit guarantees discussed in chapter three, we can argue that the
Chinese financial sector has a higher bank survival probability and a lower
separation rate (higher 1 − χSB). Since the government lets fewer firms to
fall, the implicit guarantee can be seen effective within both agents in the
financial sector, which is the reason behind the increase in θ and decrease in
χSB.
49
5.2 Implications of the Altered Model
Table 4: IRF Varibles
Abbreviation Description
Shock Processes
y Yt, production
c Ct, consumption
int it, the interest rate
k kt, capital
inv It, investment
pi pit, inflation
sb St, bank loans
ssb SSBt , shadow bank loans
lab Lt, labour
The graphs in this section illustrate the impulse response functions (IRFs) to
a model specific shock and three shocks to nine variables are analysed. Since
the model is log-linearised, the shocks to the model and the deviations from
the steady state can be interpreted as percentage changes. The blue, dotted
line represents the altered model and the straight black line represents the
original.
Figure 1 illustrates the economy’s reaction to chosen variables (which are
associated to their respective graphs in table 4) in the case of a 1% positive
shock to productivity (for example a positive technology shock). The altered
model shows initially a slower rise in production, but over time exceeds the
original model landing to 3,2 % change from the steady state production in
the time horizon of 40 periods (original model 2,8 %). A similar pattern can
be seen in investment where the altered model exceeds the original in a later
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stage.
Figure 1: IRF’s to a technological, positive 1% shock to productivity
However, greater differences in the case of productivity shock can be seen in
nominal interest rate and inflation. Inflation decreases more in the altered
model and restores balance somewhat quicker and closer to the steady state
inflation. The nominal interest rate falls in the altered model less and hits
near the steady state interest rate in period 10 while remaining higher in the
time horizon.
The altered model slightly amplifies the rise in shadow bank loans in the more
productive economic environment, but suggest leaner rise in bank loans (even
small decline from the steady state right after the shock). The banks reaction
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in the altered model comes through the monetary policy and Fisher relation
where the real effect on the nominal interest rate is smaller thus the interest
rate is higher. The productivity shock boosts the economy with lower mon-
etary policy. Now the deposit rates are higher (Fisher) and the targeting
monetary policy does not raise the borrowing rate as in the original model
(initially not at all). This leads to less bank loans since the difference be-
tween borrowing rate and deposit rate is smaller; banks have less ability to
leverage even if they have a slightly higher survival probability.
The shadow bank loans rise due to combination of increased bank survival
probability and the altered monetary policy. Based on the former point,
shadow banks have more chances to supply loans when they are not affected
negatively by the Fisher relation. In fact, the latter channel reflects the in-
crease of the deposit rate in the Fisher relation, meaning that shadow banks
have more deposits to match their funding of loans.
Figure 2 depicts IRFs of a positive monetary policy shock (policy tightening).
The shape of the IRF of production, Yt, in the first periods illustrates the
discussed implication of shadow banks reducing the real effect of a monetary
policy shock. Moreover, the alteration suggests slightly amplified effect on
production even tough the interest rate, it faces smaller real effect of the sim-
ulated 1 % shock in the altered monetary policy. Capital and consumption
explain this effect as they take bigger falls in the altered model where the
production is more capital-intense thus labour falls more in production due
to policy tightening.
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Figure 2: IRF’s to a positive 1% shock to monetary policy
The original model’s effect of shadow banks increasing and banks decreasing
loans can be seen in the scenario of monetary policy tightening. The shock
amplifies both effects in the altered model in a similar fashion than productiv-
ity shock (less bank loans and more shadow bank loans). The banks balance
sheet constraint implies that if the banks’ net worth and leverage ratio falls
it affects the firms ability to borrow, effectively reducing bank loans. Less
consumption in the altered model leads to more savings, which means more
available funding for shadow banks: Shadow bank lending increases.
Less consumption, less bank loans, and less capital. Even if shadow banks
increase lending, production falls more in the altered model. Together with
inflation falling more they explain the smaller real effect of the shock to the
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nominal interest rate since it depends more in the actual production and
target inflation.
The altered model suggest that the implemented Chinese characteristics
make the economy slightly more vulnerable to a monetary policy tighten-
ing with less consumption and capital. Also, the shocks to productivity and
monetary policy amplify the reactions to the financial sector in bank and
shadow bank loan supply, which suggests that the altered model can make
the economy all the more unstable than the original model.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper revolves around the idea of shadow bank modelling in Chinese eco-
nomic environment and discusses previous literature on the subject. Chinese
distinctive economical history and the volume of macroeconomic research on
Chinese shadow banking suggest that there are not enough theoretical and
empirical analyses on the issue.
The main motives satisfy the historical and theoretical approaches. The idea
of this paper is to further inspire research on the subject of implications of
Chinese characteristics and shadow banks to an economy, particularly due
to the growing influence of Chinese economy in the global markets.
The DSGE adjustment is the main tool for creating added value in the topic
of shadow bank modelling in China and it provides hints of economic el-
ements in the Chinese economy. The analysis provides suggestions of the
economy’s vulnerability towards monetary policy tightening and amplifica-
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tion of the financial sector’s reaction to productivity and monetary policy
shocks.
Naturally, the model analysis here has limitations and does not serve as a
valid model to be applied to the entire Chinese economy, but rather it high-
lights specific aspects of it. The distinct features of the Chinese banking
sector are disregarded in the adjustment approach, whereas models such as
Chen et al. (2020) incorporate imperfectly competitive banking system in
their DSGE study of the Chinese economy.
The DSGE framework here can also serve as a foundation to further analysis
(simulation of different shocks, different kind of adjustments, different chosen
variables to observe etc), thus the script to run the models and the model
codes themselves are provided by the author if needed.
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